

9/11: Ten Years On

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World has changed in surprising ways

The 'war on terror' defined US foreign policy for seven years and led to conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, says **Gideon Rachman**

The collapse of the twin towers on 9/11 is a visual image that is now part of history. Like the assassination of John F. Kennedy or the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was a world-changing moment – captured on film, forever.

Many people watching those horrifying images from New York knew, almost immediately, that the world would change profoundly in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on that city and on the Pentagon in Washington.

That judgment has been vindicated. But it is the nature of the change that has surprised. For it was the reaction to terrorism – rather than the terrorism itself – that mattered most.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration decided that the "war on terror" would be the defining principle of US foreign policy.

Within months, a war on Afghanistan was launched to go after the "safe havens" from which al-Qaeda had launched its attack. Despite swift success against the Taliban, that war is still dragging on.

The response to 9/11 did not stop with the Afghan invasion. Fairly swiftly, it became clear George W. Bush, then US president, was also intent on toppling Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

The origins of the Iraq war – and its link to 9/11 – lay in the determination of the Bush administration that the dramatic nature of the attack on the US would be met with an even more dramatic response.

A simple police action to go after the perpetrators in Afghanistan did not seem to match the enormity of the moment. In searching for a way



Barack Obama arrives to lay a wreath at the Ground Zero memorial on May 5, three days after the killing of bin Laden

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of defining the new US approach to the world, Mr Bush fell back on the ideas promoted by the "neoconservatives", the only faction within his administration that could present him with a satisfyingly bold explanation and response to the events of 9/11.

Two big neoconservative ideas defined the president's war on terror and led to the Iraq war. The first was the doctrine of pre-emption.

The neocons argued that because the consequences of a

large-scale terror attack – particularly with nuclear or biological weapons – would be catastrophic, the US would be justified in taking pre-emptive military action to head off such a threat.

This was a search for absolute security defined by the "1 per cent" doctrine of Dick Cheney, the vice-president, which held that if the US was faced with a 1 per cent threat that terrorists could acquire weapons of mass destruction, it should act as if it was a 100 per cent certainty.

The second big idea was that the terrorism of 9/11 was the product of a sick and despotic political culture in the Arab world – and was an attack on "freedom".

In response, the US would go on the counter-attack and adopt a "freedom agenda".

As President Bush put it, the US would act decisively to "bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets and free trade to every corner of the world".

In retrospect, however, it

looks as if the threat of terrorism – particularly to the US – was overstated in the aftermath of 9/11.

There have been further big terror attacks linked to al-Qaeda – in Madrid, Bali, London, Mumbai and elsewhere – but the monstrous attack on US mainland that was feared by so many has not materialised.

As Rudy Giuliani, the mayor of New York when the terrorists struck, reflected in 2005: "Anybody – any one of those security experts, including

myself – would have told you on September 11 2001: 'We're looking at dozens and dozens and multiyears of attacks like this'. It hasn't been quite that bad."

Nonetheless, by 2005 it was too late for second thoughts. The war on terror and the 1 per cent doctrine defined US foreign policy for the rest of the Bush administration – and led to the launch of two wars – in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, horrifying

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as they were, did not shake US dominance of the global political and economic system.

On the contrary, in the immediate aftermath of the Iraq and Afghan wars, the Bush administration and its supporters felt more confident of US power than ever.

Charles Krauthammer, the conservative columnist who had coined the phrase "the unipolar moment", greeted the initial victory in Iraq by hailing a "world

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A decade later, agencies are better at working together

US intelligence

The attacks led to soul-searching and changes, says **Anna Fifield**

The 9/11 attacks exposed grievous shortcomings in the US intelligence system, precipitating a period of governmental soul-searching.

How could the men who carried out the attacks have operated from American soil?

Why didn't anyone see the warning signs and join the dots?

Critics likened the failure of intelligence agencies to uncover and thwart attacks to the country's failure in 1941 to detect Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

Now, a decade after 9/11, many former officials and analysts agree that the many changes in the way government agencies collect and share information have led to significant improvements in the way the US intelligence community operates.

These improvements were on display in May, with the detection and killing of Osama bin Laden.

"Intelligence sharing has improved pretty dramatically since 9/11," says John McLaughlin, a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency and now at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

But he warns: "There is still a way to go in bringing the information technology necessary to support [intelligence sharing] to where it ideally ought to be."

The 9/11 Commission, the US government investigation of the failures that allowed the attacks to happen, concluded that various agencies had pieces of information, but there was no system for sharing it and connecting the dots.

Congress tried to fix this problem in 2004 by creating

a new cabinet-level post – the director of national intelligence (DNI) – and establishing a National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) to co-ordinate intelligence sharing, and, to bring the various agencies together.

In an update a decade after the attacks, the commission's leaders last month said that intelligence sharing is one area where there have been significant improvements.

"A primary failure we found was the lack of communication – agencies didn't talk to each other, they didn't share information – and that has improved greatly," says Thomas Kean, the commission chairman and a former Republican governor of New Jersey.

There is also much better co-ordination between states and local authorities, he says.

"This is very important because the person who first sees something suspicious is probably going to be a member of the public, who will alert his local authorities," Mr Kean says.

It was a street vendor who noticed a smoking van in New York's Times

Square last year, alerting police to what turned out to be a terrorist bomb plot.

Still, the intelligence services have not ironed out all their problems.

This was alarmingly illustrated in 2009, when a young Nigerian man managed to board a flight to Detroit with explosives in his underwear, even though his father had repeatedly warned authorities his son had been radicalised.

"The person who sees something suspicious first will probably be a member of the public"

Rick Nelson, an inaugural member of the NCTC who is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank, says the improvements have created some challenges.

"An analyst now has access to so much information. Access is no longer the issue; the issue is managing information and putting it in the correct context," Mr Nelson says.

"My assessment is that there will be another attack on US soil and somewhere in the government there will be a piece of information alerting us to it."

But the biggest concern for 9/11 Commission members and analysts has been the office of the director of national intelligence.

It has not been the force that had been envisaged, and there have been four DNIs in the six years since the position was created.

It is currently held by James Clapper, a retired Air Force lieutenant general who was previously undersecretary of defence for intelligence.

"The way the DNI was implemented was not what we intended," says John Lehman, a former Navy secretary.

"We intended to create a very powerful, lean leader of the intelligence community who could tear down the stovepipes and eliminate the bloat of bureaucracy that had made our intelligence community so dysfunctional in the past."

But the director does not have the power the title implies.

Nor is the hierarchy clear – the DNI does not play the anticipated role of overseeing all intelligence-related agencies.

That task will become even more difficult with the arrival of General David Petraeus, the former army commander, as the new director of the CIA.

Dennis Blair, a retired Navy admiral who held the job from 2009 until May 2010, said the position did not have the power to overcome resistance from some agencies.

Analysts say the position will not be empowered until Congress makes lines of authority clearer, and that will probably require a kick-start from the president.

The killing of bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders has led the White House to claim that the terrorist network is on the brink of extinction.


But intelligence agencies are unlikely to relax.



Local and central agency co-ordination has improved

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THE FAMILIES OF 100 INDIVIDUALS
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9/11: Ten Years On

Al-Qaeda franchises are still cause for concern

Jihadist terrorism

James Blitz on groups operating from lawless areas in the Middle East and north Africa

Ten years after the al-Qaeda attacks that scarred the US, western states continue to face serious challenges from jihadist terrorism.

But the origins and nature of today's threats are very different from those of 10 years ago.

On the one hand, what is often described as the "core al-Qaeda" group founded by Osama bin Laden – and which operates from the Pakistani tribal areas and Afghanistan – has been seriously damaged.

Bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda, is dead. Many of his followers have been killed by US-launched drone attacks. Bin Laden's successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is nowhere near as charismatic as his predecessor.

On the other hand, groups often described as the "al-Qaeda franchises" – and which operate from areas in the Middle East and north Africa – have developed in recent years. They are a

disconnected bunch and probably incapable of pulling off a spectacular attack on the scale of 9/11.

But western intelligence agencies warn that their ability to carry out an act of terrorism in the west should not be underestimated.

At the top of the list of jihadists worrying western governments is al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, a movement operating from Yemen.

Here, the individual whose activities cause most concern is Anwar al-Awlaki, a 40-year-old, US-born cleric who has been at the source of relentless plotting against the west for some years.

Mr Awlaki was the mastermind behind the attempted bombing of an aircraft over Detroit on Christmas day in 2009.

He also organised the dispatch of parcel bombs concealed in cargo aircraft bound from Yemen to Chicago in October 2010.


Airline bombs are not his only area of expertise. He has become a highly effective internet preacher, grooming people in western states to carry out attacks.

Mr Awlaki's online sermons

radicalised a woman who attempted to murder Stephen Timms, a former British cabinet minister, in a knife attack in May 2010.

This year, Mr Awlaki also emerged as the inspiration for a former British Airways employee to hatch an abortive plot to blow up an aircraft in an attack intended to kill hundreds of people.

A second franchise of concern is the group called al-Qaeda in



Leon Panetta: 'Having got bin Laden, we have identified some of the key leadership in al-Qaeda'

the Maghreb. Largely made up of Algerians, the group's main area of operation is the vast Saharan territory of southern Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger, where it exploits smuggling routes and the absence of state control.

It regularly kidnaps foreign tourists for ransom and periodically stages attacks against western targets mainly in Africa's Sahel region.

Western intelligence experts say that al-Qaeda in the Magh-

reb has recently shown its strength by helping to develop a Nigerian radical Islamist group called Boko Haram.

Last month, Boko Haram displayed its growing capability and ambition with an attack on the UN mission in Abuja that killed at least 23 people and injured more than 80.

A third franchise of concern is the al-Shabaab movement that operates in Somalia.

There are two groups within al-Shabaab. One of them, al-Ansar wants to set up an Islamist state inside Somalia and is fomenting attacks in neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia.

The other – al-Muhajiroun – is influenced by bin Laden's ideology and seeks to conduct attacks on the west.

In the UK, one of the concerns about al-Shabaab is that there are thought to be about 40 British nationals fighting for the extremist group in Somalia's civil war.

The fear is that some of these individuals may come back to the UK, rejoin the Somali community and plot an attack on British soil.

Can any of these groups instigate a serious outrage in a western nation in the next few years? There is certainly confi-

dence in the US and Britain that these franchise groups – like core al-Qaeda – are on the back foot.

This year, Leon Panetta, the former head of the CIA and now US secretary of defense, gave an upbeat assessment of the progress against al-Qaeda and all its affiliates.

"We're within reach of strategically defeating al-Qaeda," he said.

"The key is that, having got bin Laden, we've now identified some of the key leadership within al-Qaeda, both in Pakistan as well as in Yemen and other areas."

There are other reasons for confidence.

In the events of the Arab uprising this year – in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Bahrain – jihadists have been bystanders.

They have not been the protagonists that bin Laden had wanted them to be.

But western governments know the chances of a successful terrorist attack cannot be ignored.

Intelligence agencies need to be lucky at every stage of their operations against jihadist groups but the jihadists only need to be lucky once.

Fear of a 'clash of civilisations' appears to be overdone

Arab uprising

There is an urgent need for long-term international commitment to help nascent democracies, says Guy Dinmore

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent US invasions and occupation of Afghanistan and then Iraq, it appeared that Samuel Huntington, the Harvard political scientist, had been vindicated in his warnings about the "clash of civilisations... as the principal conflicts of global politics".

A decade on, the fast-paced events of the Arab uprising – with the latest developments witnessing the takeover of Tripoli by Libyan rebels – offer hope that the once-influential US political scientist got it wrong.

Not that the US and its European allies have been sitting on the sidelines as three Arab despotisms fell in quick succession.

Co-ordinated sanctions and diplomatic pressure, culminating in Nato's long-range intervention in Libya, have demonstrated that the west has not retreated into isolationism and sees itself as having a role to play in internally driven Arab movements for change.

David Cameron, the UK prime minister, and other western leaders stressed at an international conference on Libya last week, that the future of that north African nation lies in the hands of its people, backed by their considerable oil and gas resources.

Whether Washington's hesitant and reactive response to the Arab spring – dubbed by some officials as "leading from behind" – will translate into a broader doctrine redefining the limits of US power remains to be seen.

However, it is already clear that the desire for change among youth-led and broad-based movements – across north Africa to Syria and Iran – has its own energy.

Each upheaval has its specific characteristics; each country its own history and ethnic mix.

External firepower propelled the downfall of Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, but outside intervention against Syria's despotic regime is unlikely and in the case of Iran almost unthinkable. Echoes of Mr Huntington are heard among those in western capitals who still see the threat of international jihadism as justification for a "civilising" campaign.

In the elections to come in Tunisia, Egypt and, hopefully, Libya too, it seems inevitable that Islamist parties will gain traction, given the role they have played as the only serious opposition against dictators.

As one Finnish peace mediator in the region recently recounted, when he asked an Islamist leader whether he would accept a defeat at the polls, the reply came: "Yes. But will you accept us if we win?"

The electoral successes of Hamas in Palestine, Hizbollah in Lebanon and Moadada al-Sadr in Iraq raise concerns that more reformist outcomes could be swept aside.

But these were groups whose authority derived from a history of resistance. The movements that have brought change in Tunisia, Egypt and now Libya are far more complex and broad-based.

A regional model for the re-ordering of the region that western powers are more comfortable with is Turkey and the success of the post-Islamist Justice and Development party in breaking the grip of the (military) establishment, rather than the theocrats who gained the upper hand after Iran's initially broad-based revolution in 1979.

That both those large states – which have hitherto preserved neighbourly relations – are competing for regional influence adds to geopolitical tensions.

Western nostalgia for Arab authoritarianism and the illusions of security those despots succeeded in fostering is dwindling.

There is now a need for long-term international commitment to help emerging democracies and their aspiring middle classes, rather than a colonial-style dash for control of mineral resources.

The swift recognition of the National Transitional Council in Tripoli as Libya's legitimate government is a first step, accompanied by the unfreezing of billions in assets in the US and Europe.

"We cannot afford a failed pariah state on Europe's doorstep," Mr Cameron warned in Paris on September 1 as Council leaders laid out plans for a new constitution and elections within 18 months.

While cautioning that these are early days, Michael O'Hanlon of Washington's Brookings Institution, says the "success" in Libya provides

Sanctions and diplomatic pressure, culminating in Nato's intervention in Libya, show the west has not retreated into isolationism

Barack Obama with an opportunity to articulate his foreign policy vision more coherently, as he seeks a second term.

However, this is just the beginning. Vali Nasr, an Iranian-born academic and a professor at Tufts University in the US, warns that the task of paving the way for stable government to emerge from the political wreckage of Egypt after elections in November is formidable.

Political upheaval has plunged that country's economy into crisis, he notes.

Since January, unemployment has climbed to 12 per cent, and tourism – accounting for 11 per cent of GDP – has fallen by nearly half.

Some 40 per cent of the population live on less than \$2 a day, and among the country's unemployed, as many as 90 per cent are young, and two-thirds have never worked.

Egypt's economy, he says, needs radical change to open it up, shrink its bloated and corrupt public sector, reform laws and attract foreign investment.

The "bitter pill" of IMF reforms was rejected in the past, as Egypt opted for injections of aid from the US and Gulf monarchies. But, as former communist states in eastern Europe and Turkey have demonstrated, a break with the past is not impossible.

That all these challenges come at a time when western economies teeter on the brink of renewed recession underlines the need for attention and support from the international community.

Response that opened a deadly Pandora's box

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Bin Laden's adopted lands seem trapped in a vortex of violence. The al-Qaeda leader may be gone but did he win, asks Matthew Green

Osama bin Laden's dreams of establishing a global Islamic caliphate are dust. Only a handful of his longest-serving lieutenants are alive or at large. Fears that al-Qaeda might stage an even more horrifying reprise of the 9/11 terror attacks have so far come to nought.

Failures, perhaps, but in Afghanistan and Pakistan the chain of events triggered by the fall of the twin towers has cost the west far more dearly than even the man who reinvented terrorism might have hoped.

Ten years ago, both countries were on perilous trajectories, but largely at peace. They are now trapped in an accelerating whirlwind of violence that could make the region even more dangerous in the decade to come.

In Afghanistan, the price of US reprisals after 9/11 has been high, and the outcome uncertain.

Washington has lost more than 1,750 troops and almost \$500bn in an intervention that could end with the country mired in a new period of civil war. Only the seemingly remote prospect of a settlement with the Taliban is likely to avert such a catastrophe.

The knock-on effect of the 9/11 attacks has been the opening of an even deadlier Pandora's box in Pakistan.

Bin Laden's flight across the mountains of Tora Bora as "daisy-cutter" bombs rained down, served as a catalyst to energise a throng of Pakistani militants who hate the US as much as they do their own government.

The country's poisonous cocktail of growing radicalism, weak government and nuclear weapons makes even the west's dilemmas in Afghanistan look relatively straightforward.

Bin Laden was killed by US Navy Seals during a raid on his compound in an army town outside Islamabad on May 2. The cycle of bloodshed he set in motion on 9/11 will have no such tidy end.

More than 8,800 civilians have been killed in Afghanistan since the UN began counting four years ago. An estimated 12,000 civilians have died in Pakistan's welter of insurgency and terrorism in the

same period, according to the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, a think-tank.

Historians will argue over the legacy of 9/11 for decades. What can already be stated with some certainty is that the fallout from the attacks helped germinate dormant potential for chaos in both neighbours.

Once a theatre of cold war rivalry, Afghanistan had fallen under the harsh rule of Mullah Mohammed Omar's Taliban by the mid-1990s. His decision to play host to bin Laden sealed the movement's fate. When a wrathful US smote his country, Mr Omar and his acolytes fled to Pakistan.

Victory seemed to arrive quickly in Afghanistan. US agents with bushy beards and shrink-wrapped bricks of hundred dollar bills hired warlords to fight. A minimal US troop footprint and awesome air power prevailed.

Washington's attention was soon absorbed by the invasion and subsequent events in Iraq. A decade later, the west appeared to face defeat. A resurrected Taliban forced Barack Obama, the US president, to triple US troop numbers in Afghanistan to 100,000.

Hamid Karzai, the president, had charge of a government that guzzled aid but had little appetite for reform. The coalition's reliance on warlords undermined its goal of rallying the people against the insurgents.

Bin Laden's masterstroke was effectively to lure the US into the latest incarnation of a 30-year civil war.

There were successes. The country held elections, albeit marred by fraud. Women's rights and education expanded. A war economy boomed. Institutions such as parliament, the police and army have been rebuilt virtually from scratch since the end of Mr Omar's regime, even if some doubt their sustainability.

The Taliban appears to regret the price it paid for sheltering bin Laden and hints that it has severed links with transnational jihadists. Yet many fear the country will sink deeper into conflict when foreign combat forces leave in 2014.

From bin Laden's perspective, US intervention in Afghanistan brought successes and failures. His network came under immense pressure, but Nato allies found themselves in the perverse position of having deployed 140,000 troops to fight a war sustained by their very presence.

Their most notable success against al-Qaeda was to push its leadership into Pakistan, where they rapidly set about sowing the seeds of more mayhem.

Pakistan's long-standing strategy of backing the Taliban and other militant proxies as assets against India had



Positive change: although marred by fraud, Afghanistan did hold elections in 2010 Getty

turned the country into a tinderbox awaiting a spark.

Forced to choose sides as Ground Zero smouldered, Pervez Musharraf, then president, outwardly sided with Washington, alienating homegrown jihadists.

Already under strain, Pakistan's military-mullah-militant complex fragmented.

Extremist groups that adopted al-

Bin Laden's flight across the mountains of Tora Bora as 'daisy-cutter' bombs rained down energised Pakistani militants

Qaeda's ideology and expertise went on to wage an increasingly vicious internal campaign against the state. In 2009, Pakistan's own Taliban movement marched to within 60 miles of Islamabad, the capital, before being pushed back.

The US has struggled to respond. Pakistan's army has made big sacrifices in its campaign to fight the insurgency, but

billions of aid dollars have failed to persuade some in its security apparatus to decisively end their relations with violent radicals.

This has made it easier for al-Qaeda to outsource jihad to Pakistani groups including Lashkar-e-Taiba, once nurtured by the military as a proxy force in Kashmir.

The Pentagon fears the organisation, blamed by India and the US for the 2008 Mumbai terror, might now plot attacks in the west.

Washington has despatched an armada of drones to target militants at the cost of inflaming anti-US sentiment. But Pakistan remains disproportionately linked to international terror plots, including the 2005 London bombings and last year's attempt to bomb Times Square in New York.

The violence has undermined Pakistan's quest to shake off military rule, build a credible civilian government under Asif Ali Zardari, the president and roll back a rising tide of extremism.

Had he lived, bin Laden might not have been displeased with the results of his handiwork in the lands he came to know as home.

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The world has changed in some surprising ways

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dominated by a single superpower unchecked by any rival".

However, by 2008 it was clear that early military victories in Iraq and Afghanistan had given way to something much more inconclusive, bloody and frustrating.

Then, just before Barack Obama took office in 2008, the global financial crisis hit.

Its aftermath, and the change in the balance of global economic and political power it has provoked, have undermined the assumptions about US power on which the war on terror was based.

Faced with this new set of circumstances – and after a presidential campaign that

promised to get the US out of Iraq – Mr Obama came into office determined to set new priorities for foreign policy.

This has proved harder than he had hoped.

The US has managed to cut its military commitment to Iraq. But Mr Obama reluctantly agreed to a new troop surge to combat a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan.

He was also unable to fulfil his campaign pledge to close the Guantanamo prison camp for terrorist suspects. And he has increased the use of controversial drone attacks on al-Qaeda bases in Pakistan.

The "Arab spring" has provided support for the neoconservative notion that the Arab world could not – and should

not – be exempt from a global trend towards democracy. But it has also illustrated that durable change is much more likely to come from within, than via US intervention.

In the short term, the changes have heightened US anxiety about the emergence of radical movements and terrorist safe havens in a destabilised Middle East.

By contrast, the killing of Osama bin Laden in May provided the US administration with a "closure" that eluded the Bush administration.

But it has not yet ended the global war on terror (GWOT) or the enormous claim it makes on US resources.

Even as he announced he was sending more troops to Afghani-

stan, Mr Obama fretted: "We simply cannot afford to ignore the price of these wars" – an admission Mr Bush would never have made. Defence cuts are on their way.

The president knows that as the US pours money and resources into the GWOT, the truly epoch-making changes of our time are taking place in east Asia.

The rise of China and India as economic powers – and the relative decline of the US – will ultimately shape the next century far more than the terrorist threat.

But handling the rise of China and reviving the US economy are difficult and lengthy undertakings.

9/11 and the financial crisis

presented different sorts of challenges to US power.

The violent Islamist militancy highlighted by 9/11 still has the potential to do enormous damage.

But the idea that the main geopolitical trend of the next century will be the creation of a global Islamic caliphate – while a popular notion in Waziristan – is a fantasy.

It is hard to think of a philosophy that is worse adapted to dealing with the challenges of modernity than the backward-looking fundamentalism of al-Qaeda.

Indeed one consequence of 9/11 is that it may have persuaded the US to spend a decade pouring vital resources into combating the wrong threat.

Airlines keen to get away from one-size-fits-all security

Passenger checks

Roger Blitz says incidents over the past decade make it hard to balance safety and customer satisfaction

On the 10th anniversary of 9/11, people around the world will commemorate the deaths of thousands after four aircraft were seized. Since that day, not one US airline has been hijacked.

The monetary cost of aviation security has been high – it is now \$7.4bn a year, not including the amount that governments and airports spend on passenger screening, says the Interna-

tional Air Transport Association (Iata), the industry body.

The decade has also witnessed efforts by individuals to devise ways to create terror in the skies. Each incident has added fresh security measures.

But is it possible to keep up such standards of aviation security? Tony Tyler, director-general of Iata, says: "This year we expect 2.8bn people to fly. If we use today's methods, we cannot hope to manage the estimated 16bn passengers a year we expect in 2050."

The decades leading up to 9/11 saw bursts of increased security. The 1970s brought metal detectors and screening of passengers by staff trained in the psychological profiles of hijackers.

Then came X-rays scanners. The Lockerbie bombing in 1988 widened the geographical

presence of searches and X-rays.

This mixture of detecting equipment and searches was the norm until 2001. 9/11 brought a new culture to airline security, not least because it was nationalised by the US government, which set up the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

Sky marshals were recruited in large numbers, new standards were set for cockpit doors, the list of prohibited items grew. Advance passenger information was compulsory on all flights into the US.

Then, when Richard Reid tried to detonate plastic explosives in his shoes in December 2001, another wave of checks came into effect, notably passengers having to remove their footwear for inspection.

Further restrictions came in

the aftermath of the foiled "liquid bomb" plot at Heathrow airport in August 2006.

Liquids, aerosols and gels were barred from security check-ins, and laptops were scanned separately.

'The DHL cartridge bomb illustrated there are probably still big security gaps in freight transport'

In the UK, passengers were restricted to one piece of hand luggage. The limit was eventually lifted in January 2008.

The most recent airline incident has, in the US at least, created a level of security

intrusiveness that is testing the limits of public tolerance.

The discovery in October 2010 of a plot to blow up an aircraft using plastic explosives hidden in printer cartridges resulted in new measures, including pat-downs and the use of imaging machines that many passenger groups said was an unacceptable invasion of privacy.

The TSA says it will "continue to adapt" its approach to protecting the public.

"The agency will continue to work to stay one step ahead of evolving threats, and currently pat-downs are one measure used in our layered approach to detect prohibited items," it says.

Michael Denison of Control Risks, the analysts, says that while airline security has clearly improved since 9/11, significant gaps remain.

"The DHL cartridge bomb episode illustrated that there are probably still significant security lacunae in the freight transport sector," he says.

He adds: "Pre-screening would have to be conducted carefully. Profiling has been demonstrated to be ineffective; pre-screening raises civil liberties issues. In neither case is the threat likely to be significantly reduced, given the potential use of 'clean skins' to conduct operations."

Pat-downs, says Mr Tyler, should not become a standard line of airport defences.

Providing the highest levels of security and a good passenger experience is possible – "but it needs some joined-up thinking among industry partners and with governments".

Both the TSA and Iata talk about moving away from a one-

size-fits-all approach, in part a recognition of different levels of threat across the international air transport system.

Iata has been modelling a risk-assessment system that would send passengers through one of three security lanes, depending on the information about them on their documents.

"Known travellers" with completed background checks would be channelled through the fastest lane, avoiding the need to remove clothing, dispose of liquids and other requirements.

The TSA also acknowledges that the vast majority of the 2m passengers it screens every day pose little to no risk.

"At the same time, these changes must provide a level of security that is as high – or higher – than current approaches," the agency says.

Great tragedy invoked great determination

Loss and recovery

Nicole Bullock finds common threads in the ways companies dealt with crushing grief

Warren Mula began the day of September 11 2001 on the 105th floor of 2 World Trade Center with a full diary of meetings. He came in early and then headed out just before 8am for a doctor's appointment.

Mr Mula, who is now global head of the broking business for Aon, a risk management and human resource consulting company, switched elevators on the 78th floor, the "Sky Lobby," where he said hello to colleagues who were heading up to Aon's offices.

"I think everyone I saw that day perished," Mr Mula says. Aon lost 176 staff.

The 9/11 attacks caused devastating losses for companies whose offices were housed in the two towers that had come to symbolise US capitalism.

"There was no playbook,

no management course to prepare for this," Mr Mula says.

A decade later, there are common threads in how some companies dealt with the crushing loss of colleagues, friends and, in some cases, family members.

There was support for the families of those who perished. Some companies set up education and other funds and paid initial money from salaries, bonuses and payments associated with partnerships.

They also remember the victims with annual serv-

ices, memorials and tribute websites.

And, they rebuilt. "All we knew how to do was go back to work," says John Duffy, chairman and chief executive of KBW, an investment bank that lost 67 of 171 employees in the south tower. Among them, on the trading desk, was Christopher, Mr Duffy's 23-year-old son.

Amid the anger, horror and heartbreak, working

together with colleagues who survived was therapeutic. "It was a place to channel your adrenalin in a positive manner," says Thomas Michaud, KBW vice-chairman.

Howard Lutnick, chief executive of Cantor Fitzgerald, the bond and equity broker where 658 of 960 New York-based employees died in the attacks, recalls a makeshift office with camp beds where colleagues worked around the clock sleeping in four-hour shifts.


Mr Lutnick, whose brother, Gary, died, also weathered public rebuke for halting salary payments for those employees who were missing in the days after 9/11.

He argued Cantor could not pay the salaries because those revenues were no longer coming in.

In October 2001, the company instead paid bonuses to the families of those who perished – a larger amount.

The criticism has eased over the years as it also paid 25 per cent of its profits to the families for five years, a total of more than \$180m – thanks to the rebirth of the business – and healthcare expenses for 10 years.

Businesses that were severely affected but had



Wind blows the spray of water at the September 11 memorial in New York City

Getty

extensive global operations or were based outside New York still had basic infrastructure. But for others, trading books, computer systems, passwords, client lists and paper documents were destroyed.

Some businesses that were unsure they could stay afloat in the days after 9/11 not only did so but have thrived.

Cantor developed its debt capital markets business and expanded into areas such as commercial real estate. It spun off BGC Partners, an interdealer broker. Together they now trade more than \$800bn of financial instruments daily.

KBW more than doubled its staff and expanded into Europe and Asia.

Sandler O'Neill, an investment bank that lost 66 of its 171 employees, is twice the size of what it was on September 10 2001, says Jon Doyle, managing principal.

Executives credit their

success in part to a determination that came from enduring such tragedy. Nobody wanted to fail because of September 11.

Some had help in the immediate aftermath.

Wall Street, the crucible of capitalism, softened as rivals offered business and clients were supportive.

The day KBW opened for business one week after 9/11, it had three times its

normal trading volume.

Companies were also able to hire good staff quickly because many other organisations were laying people off as Wall Street came out of its late 1990s boom.

Looking back, Mr Doyle says "there were moments when it felt like too much."

He happened to be in Boston and was on a call with his New York colleagues on the 104th floor of the south

tower when the line went dead on September 11.

The grieving and healing process continues.

The office of chief medical examiner in New York City announced last month it had positively identified Ernest James, who worked in the IT department at Marsh & McLennan, as a victim of September 11.

The insurance broker and consultancy lost 295 staff

and 63 consultants that day.

"It is not something you recover from," says Dan Glaser, the company's chief operating officer. "It is something you cope with."

Like other companies that lost people in the attacks, Cantor holds a memorial service every year with the families and friends of the Cantor victims. "Together, we keep them alive," says Mr Lutnick.

Commercial imperative runs up against strong emotion

Viewpoint

EDWIN HEATHCOTE

The twin towers of New York were a symbol of global capitalism, with the skyscraper, as building type, and downtown Manhattan, as location, representing a financial and political system.

Osama bin Laden, leader of al-Qaeda, and Mohamed Atta, who piloted the first aircraft, engineers both, appreciated this potent architectural as well as political symbolism.

The World Trade Center, designed by Minoru Yamasaki, a Japanese American architect, had become a symbol of the city.

It was a visual gateway to the New World, a counterbalance to the 100 storeys of the Empire State Building at the other end of Broadway. But it was never a good building, never a real success. Planned in the mid-1960s, at a low point of modernist urbanism, it was completed in 1973, at the beginning of a recession that saw New York City in financial crisis.

The city's population was declining, its richer residents abandoning it for the suburbs, industry had all but disappeared and even the financial sector, which had conspicuously moved to midtown, seemed collectively to be contemplating leaving.

The towers stood in isolation in a series of poorly planned public spaces and on top of a shopping centre that was in sharp contrast with the buzzing streetscape. Once they had gone, the 16 acres of "Ground Zero" became one of the most politically and emotionally charged sites in the world.

The events that followed did little justice to that emotional intensity, yet they perhaps tell us what we need to know about architecture, urbanism and development in New York City.

A little less than a year after 9/11, the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation was formed to plan the complex process of rebuilding.

The site was owned by the Port Authority but Larry Silverstein, a developer, had signed a new lease on the World Trade Center on September 10 2001, the day before the attacks. He became the key figure in the saga.

The controversy over rebuilding began before the ruins had stopped smouldering. There was huge public support for the idea of rebuilding the towers as a gesture of defiance and a symbol of resilience, but many others favoured a memorial park suggesting that to build on such a charged site would be ethically wrong.

Architects weighed in, some with measured responses, some pleading for more time to think, a few with wincingly inappropriate proposals.

There was huge public support for the idea of rebuilding the towers as a symbol of resilience

After public outrage over some botched attempts at master-planning the site, a competition was held for the overall design and Daniel Libeskind, a Poland-born radical avant-garde architect and designer of Berlin's Holocaust Museum, won.

His scheme was powerful, but flawed. At its heart was a vision of the holes left by the towers' collapse, as a stark reminder of the ferocity of the event. The dark hole was to be surrounded by a crowd of spiky towers swirling to a peak in a symbolic "Freedom Tower", a jagged shard rising 1,776ft above the Manhattan bedrock, as the city's tallest skyscraper.

Almost immediately Mr Libeskind's plan was sidelined to make way for a

blantly corporate but impeccably commercial scheme by Mr Silverstein's favoured designers, SOM, the firm that once created some of downtown US's most elegant, minimal mid-century towers.

Other towers by "starchitects" were commissioned – designs by Foster and Rogers have stalled, though Fumihiko Maki's "Tower 4" is slowly rising.

All that remains of Mr Libeskind's vision is a vague memory in a crystalline tower growing on top of a base of solid concrete and prosaically renamed One World Trade Center.

But if the development of an undistinguished, corporate commercial plaza with 10m sq ft of offices springs no great surprises, the memorial itself is an undeniably arresting work.

The footprints of the twin towers have been excavated to create two lakes, each with a further square hole at their centre, down which water gushes into a seemingly infinitely deep well.

Around the edges a parapet of bronze is inscribed with the names of every victim and water falls like a flow of tears from behind the thousands of letters.

The memorial is surrounded by a new park that gives this part of lower Manhattan – traditionally the city's densest – a breathing space and where relatives and others can grieve. At the centre of the site is a museum. It contains large pieces of steel structure salvaged from the wreckage.

You could argue that New York is a city of commerce and that the authentic response to 9/11 is a commercial behemoth surrounding a garden of remembrance.

You could argue that, with a bit more time and determination and a bit less commercial pressure, this was a chance to create a vibrant, sustainable, occasionally even affordable area of city.

An open letter to our clients who believed in Alger before 9/11, who remained loyal during our rebuilding process and to all of our clients who support us today

ALGER

September 11, 2011

It is with great honor, deep pride, and bittersweet emotion that I write this letter.

On September 11, 2001, our nation suffered the most devastating terrorist attack in US history. We lost 35 of our dearest colleagues and friends at Alger's headquarters at One World Trade Center. While still in deep mourning, Alger was faced with the seemingly impossible challenge of rebuilding our organization and preserving their spirit in our future.

On this 10th anniversary, I reflect on how far we have come as a firm. We have persevered with strength, confidence, and optimism while renewing our culture, reconnecting with clients, and maintaining our focus on achieving superior performance. Today, Alger stands stronger than ever.

Alger's resilience and success are attributable to our dedicated employees and, most importantly, to loyal clients like you who have supported us through our journey. I thank you for your support these past 10 years and for your faith in our ability to, once again, be recognized as a premier investment manager.

Sincerely,

Daniel C. Chung
Chief Executive Officer, Chief Investment Officer

Fred Alger Management, Inc.
111 Fifth Avenue • New York, NY 10003

Please visit us at www.alger.com/911

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We Remember and Honor

They were adored children, parents, husbands, wives and partners. They were sisters, brothers, cherished relatives and friends. They were our colleagues, and they remain forever in our hearts.